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Abstract
The recent literature on ego depletion and self-control is plagued with failed replications. It
has been argued that publication bias might have inflated estimated effect sizes. Doubts go
so far that the very existence of the ego-depletion effect has been questioned. We
conducted two high-power tests of the ego-depletion effect, with samples in two different
countries, including a habituation phase in the depleting task (“e-crossing task”). This
addresses recent critiques on failed registered replications, which argued that habituation
was essential to obtain depletion effects. We examined the effect on error rates, response
times, and response-time variability in a subsequent Stroop task. There were no effects in
general, except a significant difference in response-time variability, only in one of the
samples, and in the opposite direction as predicted by the ego-depletion effect.
Keywords: ego depletion, self-control
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Habituation Does Not Rescue Depletion: Two Tests of the Ego-Depletion Effect
The ego-depletion effect (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven,
Tice, & Baumeister, 1998), where exercising self-control in a task results in diminished
self-control in subsequent tasks, has been discussed for over 20 years. A meta-analysis by
Hagger, Wood, Stiff, and Chatzisarantis (2010) revealed a medium-sized effect (d = 0.62)
across 198 studies, but Carter and McCullough (2013) argued that publication bias could
have led to an overestimation of the effect. Further discussion (Carter & McCullough,
2014; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014) culminated in a registered replication report (Hagger
et al., 2016), which failed to find significant effects. This has led to skepticism and
thorough questioning of the evidence (see, e.g., Gissubel, Beiramar, & Freire, 2018).
The results of Hagger et al. (2016) were contested by Baumeister and Vohs (2016) due
to the implementation of the initial task. In this task, based on Baumeister et al. (1998),
self-control resources are depleted by crossing out instances of the letter “e” according to a
complex rule with several exceptions (compared with the control, where all instances are
crossed out). Inhibiting the impulse to cross out the letter requires self-control. Hagger et
al. (2016) used a computerized version of the task by Sripada, Kessler, and Jonides (2014)
which did not include a so-called habituation phase. Baumeister and Vohs (2016) argued
that the habituation phase is necessary to create the habit which is to be inhibited later.
In contrast, Arber et al. (2017) argued that an e-crossing task even without habituation
phase includes several steps that require self-control, and thus should also be depleting. It
should be noted that Baumeister and Vohs (2016) also criticized the computerized version.
However, that format was also successfully used in Alós-Ferrer, Hügelschäfer, and Li
(2015), and Arber et al. (2017) showed depletion effects for both versions (computerized
and paper-and-pencil) of the e-crossing task.
Following Baumeister and Vohs (2016), an ego-depletion effect should obtain if a
habituation phase is included. However, the ego-depletion effect might be weak. In view of
the failed registered replication of Hagger et al. (2016), Friese, Loschelder, Gieseler,
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Frankenbach, and Inzlicht (2018) analyze various arguments for and against the evidence of
the existence of an ego-depletion effect. The mai nargument against it is that possible
publication bias might have lead to an overestimation of the effect size, and hence the
ego-depletion effect might be weak or even non-existent. A third view is that ego-depletion
exists but is moderated by the susceptibility to lay theories of limited willpower. Job,
Dweck, and Walton (2010) show ego-depletion effects for subjects who hold beliefs about
limited willpower, while subjects believing in unlimited willpower did not show diminished
self-control.
In two separate studies (carried out in different countries), we tested the
ego-depletion effect adding a habituation phase to the task of Sripada et al. (2014), with
large sample sizes determined to achieve more than sufficient power. Our hypothesis was
that the ego-depletion effect would be observed and moderated by implicit theories of
self-control as argued by Job et al. (2010). That is, we allowed for the possibility that
ego-depletion effects are only relevant if the participant’s lay views on self-control endorse a
limited-resource view.
Method
To determine sample size, we followed Hagger et al. (2016), who conducted an ex ante
power analysis with α = 0.01 and 1 − β = 0.95 for a medium effect size (d = 0.62) based on
the meta-analysis of Hagger et al. (2010). With these assumptions, they calculated 168
participants (84 in each condition) for a one-sided test. Given the commonly-applied (and
demanding) inclusion criteria (Karalunas, Huang-Pollock, & Nigg, 2013; Sripada et al.,
2014 excluded 14 out of 108 subjects, i.e. 12.96%), we increased sample size and rounded
up taking into account lab sizes. In Experiment 1, we conducted 8 sessions of at most 30
participants each. Taking into account no-shows, we collected data for N = 229
participants. In Experiment 2, we conducted 5 sessions of 48 participants each and
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collected data for N = 240 participants (there were no no-shows).1 We relied on Hagger et
al. (2016) for the power analysis for comparability. However, considering that the effect
size might be overestimated, we remark that, even for a small-to-moderate effect size
(d = 0.35), a sample of N = 215 and a probability level α = 0.05 still yields a power of 0.82.
Both experiments followed the same design. First, participants completed a number
of scales including the 6-items scale of Job et al. (2010) to assess implicit theories of
self-control (“lay self-control”). It contains six items with answers ranging from 1 (strongly
agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). In Experiment 1, carried out in Germany, we used the
original items of Job et al. (2010).2 For Experiment 2, we translated the items into Spanish
using a back-translation procedure involving two independent translators. Following Job et
al. (2010), the scale was embedded among several other implicit-theory measures, to avoid
making the purpose of the scale obvious. The exact order of the scales was: implicit
theories of intelligence, willpower, resisting temptations, character, and emotions. Then,
participants conducted the “e” task as in Sripada et al. (2014) and Alós-Ferrer et al.
(2015), with the exception that a habituation phase was added. Specifically, for 32 trials,
all participants had to respond by pressing a key if a word displayed on screen contained
the letter “e.” Then, 68 further trials followed, where controls performed the exact same
task but participants assigned to the depletion condition had to press the key if the word
contained an “e,” unless a vowel followed the “e” or there was another vowel two letters
away from the “e” in either direction.3 A single trial lasted 3000 ms and the whole “e” task
lasted 5 minutes. The sets of words were chosen to have identical target rates in both
experiments, independently of the language. After the “e” task was completed, participants
were asked to indicate how exhausting they found the task.
1Sample size should also be sufficient to detect possible interactions with implicit theories of self-control.
According to a G*Power calculation, an effective sample size of N = 200 would give a power of 0.82 for
detecting a medium effect size (f = 0.25) at α = 0.01 through the interaction term in an ANCOVA.
2We thank Veronika Job for facilitating the original scale and advising us on how to implement it.
3Due to a programming error, in Experiment 2 the second phase consisted of 67 trials instead of 68.
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After the “e” task, participants completed a computerized Stroop task for 72 trials:
24 congruent words naming a color printed in the same color, 24 incongruent words naming
a different color to the one the word was printed in, and 24 neutral words printed in some
color but naming a non-color word. Four different colors were included. A single trial
lasted 3000 ms and for the analysis a few trials (0.01%) which had extremely short
response times (below 250 ms) were recoded as missing. The different types of trials were
interleaved. The hypothesis was that depleted participants would have less resources to
inhibit their responses in incongruent trials. After the Stroop task, subjects were again
asked to indicate how exhausting they found the task. Finally, participants filled in the
13-item Brief Self-Control Scale of Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004) and an
exploratory scale (not used here), and were requested to provide demographic data (e.g.,
age and gender). The German version of the Brief Self-Control Scale was taken from
Bertrams and Dickäuser (2009); since no Spanish version was available in the literature at
that point, we translated the items into Spanish using a back-translation procedure
involving two independent translators.
We relied on three measures of performance in the Stroop task. The first is the
percentage of errors for which some studies find depleted participants to have higher error
rates in incongruent trials compared with controls (Friese, Binder, Luechinger, Boesiger, &
Rasch, 2013; Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006). However, error rates in the Stroop
task are typically very small, and hence many studies focus on other measures (Fennis,
Janssen, & Vohs, 2008; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005). We hence did not wish to confine
ourselves to this measure. The second is response times, where the prediction would be
longer response times in incongruent trials for depleted participants compared with
controls (Fennis et al., 2008; Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006). For instance, Inzlicht
and Gutsell (2007) find an effect in response times in the Stroop task even though there
was no effect on error rates. For both errors and response times, as an additional
performance measure we also rely on the interference between incongruent and congruent
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trials (that is, the difference between error rates or response times between both types of
trials) as well as between incongruent and neutral trials. The final performance measure is
response time variability (RTV) following Sripada et al. (2014) and Hagger et al. (2016).
RTV is calculated by adding the σ and τ parameters of a fitted ex-Gaussian distribution of
response times for each individual. The ex-Gaussian distribution is derived from the sum of
a Gaussian (determined by µ and σ) and an exponential distribution (determined by τ).
The characteristics of the ex-Gaussian distribution fit response time data very well
(Dawson, 1988) and the sum of the variability parameters σ and τ , i.e. RTV, is considered
a correlate of attentional control (see Sripada et al., 2014, for details). The hypothesis is
that depleted participants would exhibit higher RTV in incongruent trials, reflecting a
difficulty in maintaining task-directed focus.
Both experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Ex-gaussian
modeling was programmed in R and data were analyzed using Stata. For response time
analyses, we followed the procedures for exclusions described in Karalunas et al. (2013) and
Sripada et al. (2014). Specifically, for each participant we excluded observations in the
Stroop task with response times two standard deviations away from the individual mean
for correct responses in incongruent trials, and analogously for congruent and neutral trials.
We also had to exclude a colour-blind participant and 7 further participants due to
technical problems. After all exclusions, the sample size was N = 225 in Experiment 1 and
N = 236 in Experiment 2. For the RTV analyses (and only for those) we further excluded
participants with RTVs two standard deviations away from the experiment’s mean (15
exclusions), yielding N = 222 and N = 224 for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2,
respectively.
The registered replication of Hagger et al. (2016) used a demanding exclusion rule by
which all participants with an error rate of 20% or more in the “e” task were excluded from
the analysis. This criterion is questionable, because if the manipulation works, participants
in the depletion condition face a cognitively more demanding task than controls, and hence
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it is to be expected that the exclusion rule leads to a selection problem where significantly
more participants are excluded in the depletion condition than in the control condition.
Higher error rates for the depletion task are, simply put, part of the nature of the task.
This was overwhelmingly the case in both of our (independent) samples. Surprisingly,
Hagger et al. (2016) report that this only occurred in 5 of the 23 studies they include,
raising reasonable doubts as to whether their manipulation (without habituation) actually
successfully induced ego depletion. In view of this possible criticism, we analyzed our data
both with the exclusion rule mentioned above and without it. However, we obtained
exactly the same results in both cases, and hence report here the largest sample, adding
only a summary of the analysis of the restricted sample at the end of the Results section.
For each experiment, we conducted t-tests for response times, errors, and RTVs. We
conducted ANCOVAs taking advantage of the full range of the lay self-control scale. As an
additional illustration, we further implemented a median split of participants with subjects
scoring higher on the lay self-control scale being those with a higher belief in willpower as a




Experiment 1 was conducted at a large German university. After exclusions, there
were N = 225 participants (120 females; age 17 to 33, M = 21.59, SD = 2.78), of which 115
were controls and 110 were in the depletion condition. The depletion version of the “e”
task was harder as reflected by response times: the mean RTs were 1733 ms (95%
CI= [1683, 1784]) in the depletion condition and 753 ms (95% CI= [725, 781]) for controls,
t(223) = 33.97, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 4.53. The participants also differed in the error rates
of the second phase of the depletion task. The error rates were M = 10.76% for depleted
participants (95% CI= [8.52, 13.00]) and M = 0.79% for controls (95% CI= [0.04, 1.55]).
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The difference was highly significant, t(223) = 8.50, p < .001, d = 1.13. A non-parametric
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (more appropriate for a comparison of error rates, which are
bound to the [0, 1] interval) also revealed a highly significant difference, z = 11.99,
p < .001. These measurements were in line with the self-reported exhaustion level after the
task. On a scale from 0 (not exhausting at all) to 100 (very exhausting), participants in the
depletion group reported an average of 44.63 (95% CI= [39.64, 49.61]) which was
significantly higher than the average of 11.79 (95% CI= [8.70, 14.88]) reported by the
control group (t(223) = 11.21, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.49). The lay self-control scale was
reliable (N = 225, Cronbach’s α = .84, M = 4.08, SD = 0.81).
In the Stroop task, error rates for correct responses in incongruent trials were very
low, M = 3.02% for depleted participants (95% CI= [2.15, 3.89]) and M = 3.64% for
controls (95% CI= [2.73, 4.55]). The difference was not significant, t(223) = −0.97,
p = 0.333, d = −0.13. A non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test also revealed no
significant difference, z = −1.00, p = .316.
Results for response times and RTVs are illustrated in Figure 1. Our first measure
are response times for correct responses in incongruent trials of the Stroop task. Those
were not significantly different for depleted participants (M = 1170 ms, 95%
CI= [1137, 1202]) and controls (M = 1175 ms, 95% CI= [1143, 1208]), t(223) = −0.23,
p = .818, d = −0.03. A one-way ANCOVA also revealed no effect of ego depletion on mean
response times controlling for the scores on implicit theory of willpower, F (1, 222) = 0.05,
p = .817, η2 = 0.000. The differences in response times were also not significant for
participants endorsing an unlimited theory (depleted: N = 51, M = 1163 ms, 95%
CI= [1115, 1211]; controls: N = 54, M = 1155 ms, 95% CI= [1105, 1206]; t(103) = 0.22,
p = .828, d = 0.04) or those endorsing a limited-resource theory of self-control (depleted:
N = 59, M = 1176 ms, 95% CI= [1130, 1221]; controls: N = 61, M = 1193 ms, 95%
CI= [1151, 1235]; t(118) = −0.55, p = .585, d = −0.10).
The same conclusions were obtained using the Stroop interference scores for errors
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and response times between depleted participants and the control group. The average
interference score for errors between incongruent trials and congruent trials was
M = 1.80% for depleted participants (95% CI= [0.86, 2.74]) and M = 1.95% for controls
(95% CI= [0.93, 2.96]). The difference was not significant (t(223) = −0.21, p = 0.837,
d = −0.03). The average interference score for response times was M = 113 ms for
depleted participants (95% CI= [93, 132]) and M = 102 ms for controls (95%
CI= [83, 121]). The difference was also not significant (t(223) = 0.79, p = 0.432, d = 0.11).
A one-way ANCOVA also revealed no effect of ego depletion on mean interference scores
for response times controlling for implicit theories of willpower (F (1, 222) = 0.61, p = .434,
η2 = 0.003). Individual tests in each subsample created by a median split with respect to
willpower theories also failed to reveal any significant difference.4
Our third measure are RTVs as described above. Again, there were no significant
differences between depleted participants (M = 0.31, 95% CI= [0.30, 0.33]) and controls
(M = 0.32, 95% CI= [0.30, 0.34]), t(220) = −0.33, p = .742, d = −0.04. A one-way
ANCOVA also revealed no effect of ego depletion on RTVs controlling for the scores on
implicit theory of willpower, F (1, 219) = 0.13, p = .723, η2 = 0.001. The result remains
unchanged for unlimited-theory participants (depleted, N = 50, M = 0.32, 95%
CI= [0.29, 0.35]; controls, N = 53, M = 0.32, 95% CI= [0.30, 0.35]; t(101) = −0.21,
p = .834, d = −0.04) and limited-theory ones (depleted, N = 58, M = 0.31, 95%
CI= [0.29, 0.34]; controls, N = 61, M = 0.32, 95% CI= [0.29, 0.34]; t(117) = −0.25,
p = .801, d = −0.05).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted at a large Spanish university. After exclusions, there
were N = 236 participants (132 females; age 17 to 37, M = 20.22, SD = 2.39), of which 118
were controls and 118 were in the depletion condition. The depletion version of the “e”
4We also tested for differences in the Stroop interference scores between incongruent and neutral trials.
There were no significant differences.






















































Depleted Control Depleted Control
 
 
Figure 1 . Experiment 1. Comparison of response times and RTVs between depleted
participants and controls.
task was harder as reflected by response times, error rates, and self-reported exhaustion
levels. The mean response times for correct responses were 1588 ms (95% CI= [1537, 1639])
in the depletion condition5 and 700 ms (95% CI= [679, 720]) for controls (t(233) = 32.03,
p < .001), Cohen’s d = 4.18. The mean error rates in the second phase of the depletion
task were M = 11.35% for depleted participants (95% CI= [9.12, 13.57]) and M = 0.39%
for controls (95% CI= [0.24, 0.55]). The difference was highly significant (t(234) = 9.72,
p < .001, d = 1.27). A non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test also revealed a highly
significant difference, z = 12.93, p < .001. These measurements were in line with the
self-reported exhaustion level after the task. On a scale from 0 (not exhausting at all) to
100 (very exhausting), participants in the depletion group reported an average of 36.89
(95% CI= [32.12, 41.66]) which was significantly higher than the reported average of 21.32
5One subject failed to provide any correct response.
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(95% CI= [17.01, 25.64]) of the control group (t(234) = 4.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.62).
The lay self-control scale was reliable (N = 236, Cronbach’s α = .74, M = 4.87, SD = 0.77).
Error rates in the Stroop task were not significantly different between depleted
participants (M = 2.88%, 95% CI= [2.15, 3.61]) and controls (M = 2.56%, 95%
CI= [1.84, 3.28]), t(234) = 0.62, p = 0.536, d = 0.08. A non-parametric Wilcoxon
Rank-Sum test also revealed no significant difference, z = 0.81, p = .418.
Results for response times and RTVs are illustrated in Figure 2. As in Experiment 1,
response times for correct responses in incongruent trials of the Stroop task were not
significantly different for depleted participants (M = 1161 ms, 95% CI= [1130, 1192]) and
controls (M = 1130 ms, 95% CI= [1104, 1156]), t(234) = 1.51, p = .132, d = 0.20. A
one-way ANCOVA also revealed no effect of ego depletion on mean response times
controlling for the scores on implicit theory of willpower, F (1, 233) = 2.49, p = .116,
η2 = 0.011. The differences in response times were also not significant for participants
endorsing an unlimited-resource theory of self-control (depleted: N = 55, M = 1145 ms,
95% CI= [1103, 1188]; controls: N = 52, M = 1115 ms, 95% CI= [1073, 1156];
t(105) = 1.04, p = .302, d = 0.20), or for those endorsing a limited theory (depleted:
N = 63, M = 1175 ms, 95% CI= [1130, 1220]; controls: N = 66, M = 1143 ms, 95%
CI= [1109, 1176]; t(127) = 1.15, p = .253, d = 0.20).
The same conclusions were obtained using Stroop interference scores for errors and
response times between depleted participants and the control group. The average
interference score for errors between incongruent and congruent trials was M = 1.29% for
depleted participants (95% CI= [0.46, 2.12]) and M = 1.22% for controls (95%
CI= [0.44, 2.00]). The difference was not significant, t(234) = 0.11, p = 0.910, d = 0.01.
The average interference score for response times was M = 105 ms for depleted
participants (95% CI= [86, 123]) and M = 98 ms for controls (95% CI= [80, 116]). The
difference was also not significant, t(234) = 0.50, p = 0.619, d = 0.06. A one-way ANCOVA
also failed to reveal any effect of ego depletion on mean interference scores for response
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Figure 2 . Experiment 2. Comparison of response times and RTVs between depleted
participants and controls.
times controlling for implicit theories of willpower (F (1, 233) = 0.25, p = .620, η2 = 0.001).
Individual tests in each subsample created by a median split according to willpower
theories also did not reveal any significant differences.6
In contrast to Experiment 1, the difference in RTVs was clearly significant, but in the
opposite direction as expected. RTVs for depleted participants (M = 0.30, 95%
CI= [0.29, 0.31]) were significantly lower than RTVs for controls (M = 0.32, 95%
CI= [0.31, 0.34]), t(222) = −2.43, p = .016, Cohen’s d = −0.32. A one-way ANCOVA
confirmed a significant effect of ego depletion on RTVs after controlling for the scores on
implicit theory of willpower, F (1, 221) = 5.90, p = .016, η2 = 0.026. The result comes from
participants with an unlimited-theory of willpower (depleted, N = 51, M = 0.30, 95%
6As in Experiment 1, there were also no differences in the Stroop interference scores for incongruent vs.
neutral trials.
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CI= [0.28, 0.32]; controls, N = 49, M = 0.34, 95% CI= [0.32, 0.36]; t(98) = −2.80, p = .006,
d = −0.56); for limited-theory participants, RTVs for depleted participants (N = 61,
M = 0.30, 95% CI= [0.28, 0.32]) were not significantly lower than RTVs for controls
(N = 63, M = 0.31, 95% CI= [0.29, 0.33]), t(122) = −0.74, p = .463, d = −0.13).
Alternative exclusion rule
We repeated the whole analysis with the exclusion rule used by Hagger et al. (2016).
That is, we obtained reduced samples by first excluding participants with error rates above
20% in the “e” task. This led to 36 exclusions, of which 35 were in the depletion
treatments and only one in the control treatments. Then, we applied the previous
exclusion criteria for response-time analysis, that is, for each participant we excluded
observations in the Stroop task with response times two standard deviations away from the
individual mean (for correct responses in incongruent trials). As in the full-sample case, we
excluded a colour-blind participant and 7 further participants due to technical problems.
After all exclusions, the reduced sample size was N = 209 in Experiment 1 and N = 216 in
Experiment 2. Of course, exclusions happened significantly more often for the depletion
groups (Experiment 1: χ2(1) = 11.42, p = .001; Experiment 2: χ2(1) = 18.52, p < .001).
For the analysis of RTVs we then excluded participants with RTVs two standard deviations
away from the reduced sample’s mean (14 exclusions). The final sample size for the
analysis of RTV is N = 205 in Experiment 1 and N = 206 in Experiment 2.
All tests and analyses were qualitatively unchanged with the reduced samples with
one exception. In Experiment 1, a one-way ANCOVA confirmed a significant effect of ego
depletion on Stroop-task error rates after controlling for the scores on implicit theory of
willpower, F (1, 206) = 2.90, p = .090, η2 = 0.014. A t-test confirmed that average error
rates in the Stroop task in Experiment 1 were significantly smaller for the ego-depletion
group (M = 2.57%, 95% CI= [1.74, 3.39]) than for the control group (M = 3.67%, 95%
CI= [2.75, 4.59]). This is weakly significant (t(207) = −1.74, p = .083, d = −0.24), but
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unsurprising since the alternative exclusion rule led to the exclusion of high error rates
which happened more often in the ego-depletion group. In contrast, the more appropriate
non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test shows no significant difference (z = −1.49,
p = .136). Other results are unchanged and not significant, except for those for RTVs in
Experiment 2, which were as in the full sample.
Exploratory Analyses
We included the brief version of the Trait Self-Control Scale of Tangney et al. (2004),
which was reliable (Experiment 1: N = 225, α = 0.80, M = 41.18, SD = 7.03; Experiment
2: N = 236, α = 0.78, M = 41.08, SD = 6.96). The scale did not significantly correlate
with error rates, response times, or RTVs in the Stroop task in either experiment. There
were also no significant correlations when splitting the samples in depleted participants and
controls, with only one exception: for depleted participants in Experiment 1, the scale
correlated positively with RTVs (N = 108, r = 0.17, p = .084). This relation was not found
for controls in Experiment 1 and was not replicated in Experiment 2, neither for depleted
participants nor for controls.
Our ego-depletion task provides a quantifiable measure of performance in the form of
error rates in the e-crossing task. In an exploratory analysis we compared the performance
in the depletion task with various Stroop performance measures, separately for the
ego-depletion and the control group. in both experiments, we find a significant positive
correlation between errors in the e-crossing task and errors in the incongruent trials in the
Stroop task for the depleted group (Experiment 1, N = 110, r = 0.25, p = .010;
Experiment 2, N = 118, r = 0.18, p = .053). The correlations were not significant for the
control group. This is unsurprising, because error rates in the e-crossing task are very low
for the control group. The correlation for the depletion group simply reflects individual
differences. We also found significant correlations with other measures, but not
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systematically across experiments.7
Discussion
Contrary to our hypotheses, we cannot confirm the predictions of the ego-depletion
effect, independently of whether error rates, response times, interference scores for error
rates, interference scores for response times, or response-time variability are used as
dependent variables. In one experiment, but not in the other, there was a clear effect on
response-time variability, which however went in the opposite direction as expected
according to the interpretation of this variable (Karalunas et al., 2013; Sripada et al., 2014)
and the ego-depletion effect.
Of course, we cannot conclude that the ego-depletion effect is a mirage, and this was
not our intention when we set to carry out the studies reported here. However, our
evidence suggests four possibilities. First, inducing ego depletion might be a subtler
proposition than previously assumed. The “e” task was considered highly effective for this
purpose (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014). Despite positive results of its computerized
version (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2015; Sripada et al., 2014), the registered replication of Hagger
et al. (2016) failed to find effects using it, and Baumeister and Vohs (2016) criticized the
lack of a habituation phase. We failed to find the expected results even though we used a
habituation phase, hence this might not be the difficulty after all.
Second, measuring ego depletion, even if successfully induced, might be harder than
usually assumed. According to the depletion logic, a common resource is employed in both
7In Experiment 1 (but not in Experiment 2), errors in the e-crossing task correlated with Stroop-error
interference scores for both incongruent vs. congruent trials (N = 110, r = 0.16, p = .088) and incongruent
vs. neutral trials (N = 110, r = 0.24, p = .011). In Experiment 2 (but not in Experiment 1), errors in the
e-crossing task correlated with response times (N = 118, r = 0.20, p = .028) and RTV (N = 112, r = 0.16,
p = .085) in the Stroop task. Errors in the e-crossing task did not correlate with interference scores for
response times in the Stroop task in either experiment. No correlation of any type was observed for the
control group in either experiment.
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the manipulation task and the task used to measure the effects. The Stroop task is
standard in ego-depletion studies, but our results might be evidence of an asymmetry, that
is, tasks which work well to induce depletion might not be suitable to measure its effects.
Third, the scope of the tasks considered in the literature might be too broad. It might
be necessary to consider a finer taxonomy of the cognitive functions which are temporarily
weakened by specific ego-depletion manipulations. For instance, manipulations as the
Stroop task require strong cognitive inhibition processes, while alternative manipulations
involve rather different processes. An extreme example is the cold pressor task (Schmeichel
& Vohs, 2009; Vohs et al., 2008), which relies on processes of pain control. Ego-depletion
effects might simply be too weak if the manipulation and the subsequent task require
different cognitive functions or processes. However, as just discussed, the obvious
possibility to use the exact same task or very similar ones might not be a solution.
Last, the consequences of ego-depletion might be less well-understood than usually
assumed. Our second experiment found an effect contrary to current interpretations of ego
depletion, which was absent in our first experiment, conducted in a different country.
Previous studies involving the same countries where we collected data (Achtziger,
Alós-Ferrer, & Wagner, 2015, 2016, 2018) have found different effects of ego depletion
across countries in the domain of social preferences. This is perhaps not so surprising, as it
can be argued that there is a marked heterogeneity in what constitutes default behavior in
that domain, possibly giving rise to country effects or cultural differences. Savani and Job
(2017) found a reverse ego-depletion effect in India compared to the Western culture. Why
there should be cultural differences between two Western countries (Germany and Spain)
in effects and manipulations as simple as those studied here, however, remains an open
question.
These possibilities are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Rather, they suggest
possible avenues for a revision of the theories underlying ego-depletion effects, with the aim
of explaining why those effects are sometimes observed and sometimes missed. Our results
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suggest that, in order to accomplish this objective, such a revision might need to
incorporate previously neglected elements.
Our studies have of course limitations. First, it might be that, even including a
habituation phase, the e-crossing task was not sufficiently depleting. Brown and Bray
(2017) find that depletion effects occur after reaching a threshold somewhere between 4
and 6 minutes (for their depletion task). Similarly, Arber et al. (2017) found that, after a
certain threshold, performance in the depletion task itself significantly decreased, which
they interpreted as a sign of diminished self-control. The task was not comparable to ours,
as it relied on certain stories (performance started decreasing between story two and three,
out of five). We did not find a steady decrease in performance in the e-crossing task with
the number of trials, in contrast to Arber et al. (2017). The duration of our e-crossing task
was 5 minutes, which has been found to be effective in causing diminished self-control in
other studies (Achtziger et al., 2018; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2015). However, our manipulation
checks indicated strong differences between depleted participants and the control group. It
would be desirable to measure ego-depletion over longer time frames, allowing to increase
the strength of the manipulation. Of course, arguing that a manipulation was weak
constitutes a general critique which could apply to all non-significant results in the
ego-depletion literature. However, it is our impression that part of the interest in the ego
depletion effects arose due to the impression that they would be induced by minimal, weak
manipulations. If one were to conclude that ego depletion effects only appear for very
strong manipulations, the theory would lose a large part of its appeal.
A second limitation is that, as most of the literature we relied on laboratory
experiments. Even if the effects of ego depletion in the lab turn out to be too weak to be of
general interest, we cannot exclude the possibility that they are relevant for
naturally-occurring temptations. following up on this possibility requires a completely
different approach. For instance, Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, and Vohs (2012)
registered naturally-occurring, everyday temptations of participants for a whole week.
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A third limitation concerns the power necessary to detect ego depletion effects if
those turn out to be very weak. To determine sample size, we started from the one used in
the multi-lab registered replication of Hagger et al. (2016). Friese et al. (2018) argue that
the effect size of d = 0.62 used there, as originally estimated by Hagger et al. (2010), might
quite possibly be inflated due to publication bias. Our studies (with both N > 200)
actually have a power of 0.82 for an small-to-moderate effect size (d = 0.35). Recent results
by Garrison, Finley, and Schmeichel (2018) estimate an even smaller effect size of d = 0.20
for ego-depletion. Our studies lack the power necessary for identifying such a small effect
(0.43). Hence, we cannot discard the possibility that ego depletion exists but its effects are
very weak. Of course, if this is the case and the effects of ego depletion are so small, the
relevance of the phenomenon and associated theory is greatly diminished.
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